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I. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider Awarding PMC Attorney's 
Fees and Costs for Prevailing in the Contract Claim on Summary Judgment. 
Mark Van ("Van") does not dispute that under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) an 
award of fees to the prevailing party in a contract action is mandatory. Instead, Van argues that 
although this Court remanded the case for trial on the whistleblower claim and expressly allowed 
it to consider attorney fees "related to the appeal" based on the outcome of the trial, the district 
court lacked junsdiction to award fees to PMC for prevailing on summary judgment. These 
arguments are unsupported by the relevant case law, and must fail. 
1. Attorney's fees and costs were a subsidiary issue within the court's 
jurisdiction on remand and the trial court erred in failing to consider 
awarding fees for prevailing on the contract claims. 
Nothing in this Court's remand order reversing summary judgment and vacating 
the attorney's fee award prevented the trial court from awarding attorney's fees after PMC then 
prevailed, at trial, on all claims. Van argues that because the award of attorney's fees on appeal 
was vacated, it could not be reinstated. Respondent's Br. at 36. PMC does not dispute that the 
award of fees was vacated, but PMC's entitlement to an award of fees did not vanish. Judgments 
or orders are frequently entered on remand after the same decision was previously vacated. In 
this very case, the district court entered judgment for PMC on the whistleblower claim in 2007, 
and again in 2011 after the first judgment was vacated. See Supplemental Record ("Supp. R.") at 
682-83 and R. VoL II at 343-44. Van cannot, and does not, argue that the district court did not 
have authority to enter judgment for PMC simply because the earlier judgment was vacated. 
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This Court has previously addressed this issue and upheld the reinstatement of 
vacated fee awards. In Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 545, 82 P.3d 450,457 (2003), the 
Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for Rockefeller and vacated the fee award. On 
remand, the trial court again found in favor of Rockefeller and "reinstated its prior award of 
attorney fees." Id. Grabow appealed, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
the award. Id. CitingJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'!, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258, 939 P.2d 
574,577 (1997), this Court upheld the award as the attorney fees were a subsidiary issue to the 
issues to be decided on remand. Id. 
Perhaps seeking to avoid this clear precedent, Van construes PMC's argument to 
be that either this Court's remand order stayed the fee award, or as arguing that the trial court 
was required to automatically reinstate the award when PMC prevailed at trial. This is not 
PMC's position. PMC argues that the district court erred in failing to even consider PMC's 
entitlement to the earlier award of fees and costs for prevailing at summary judgment, on the 
contract claims and the action as a whole. Notably, the trial court did not rule that Judge 
McDermott's award was unreasonable or inconsistent with the law. See R. Vol. III at 567-68. 
Instead, the court erred in narrowly construing this Court's decision in the prior appeal as 
depriving it of jurisdiction to reinstate the award of fees on summary judgment. Id. The trial 
court's interpretation is erroneous; this Court's decision neither barred PMC from receiving the 
mandatory fees nor precluded the district court from considering them. 
Van's argument that the trial court reached its decision not to award fees by an 
exercise of discretion misreads the record. Cross-Respondent's Br. at 40. The court did not use 
2 Client:2923532.2 
its discretion in deciding not to award fees on the contract claim; instead it clearly stated that it 
did not believe it had any discretion: 
This Court's authority does not extend to those fees already 
vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court. As such, this Court hereby 
finds the Defendant, as the prevailing party on remand, is entitled 
to an award of fees and costs incurred in pursuit ofthe appeal to 
the Idaho Supreme Court in the amount of$38,192.82. However, 
the Defendant is not entitled to reimbursement for the costs and 
fees associated with defending against the Plaintiff s breach of 
contract claims. 
R. Vol. III at 568 (emphasis added). The court did not perceive the award of attorney's fees as 
an issue of discretion, nor did it reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See Lee v. 
Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 9, 189 P.3d 467,471 (2008). Therefore, its decision cannot stand. It 
was not reasonable for the trial court to read this Court's decision narrowly so as to preclude an 
award of attorney's fees and costs that are mandatory under controlling law. The error was even 
less reasonable given clear precedent holding that attorney's fees may be considered on remand 
except in limited cases where the remand is purely ministerial. See Rockefeller, 139 Idaho at 
545,82 P.3d at 457, and cases cited infra. The abuse of discretion is exacerbated by the trial 
court's determination that PMC was the prevailing party on all claims, including the contract 
claims, and its recognition that except for the ambiguous language in the decision, PMC would 
be entitled to a mandatory award of costs and fees. R. Vol. III at 557,567-68. 
Attorney's fees were a subsidiary issue within the general remand of the 
whistleblower claim. This Court has held that when a remand is merely ministerial, the trial 
court may not consider additional issues, but where the remand is not ministerial, subsidiary 
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issues not passed on by the Court may be considered. Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830,833, 
979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999). For example, in Hummer the remand was considered ministerial 
because the trial court's authority was limited to entering the amended judgment ordered by the 
Court. !d. Accordingly, the trial court had no authority to award or consider attorney's fees. !d. 
In Chemetics, however, the remand was narrow but not ministerial. Chemetics, 130 Idaho at 
257-58,939 P.2d at 576-77. In that case, the Court ordered the trial court to reconsider the 
award of fees to Simplot and reconsider the prevailing party analysis, but did not address an 
award of fees to Chemetics. Id. at 257. The trial court refused to award fees to Chemetics, the 
new prevailing party, because the Court's remand did not address such fees. Id. This was error. 
Id. at 258. Because the claims involved a commercial transaction, "the prevailing party [was] 
entitled to attorney's fees ... unless the remand from this Court limited the district court from 
considering the question of the award of costs and fees to Chemetics." Id. at 257. It did not. Id. 
Although not specifically addressing whether Chemetics was entitled to fees, the Court's 
decision "in and of itself changed the prevailing party and thus granted the district judge 
jurisdiction to address any issue, like attorney fees, that was related to the result in the appeal." 
Hummer, 132 Idaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 119l. 
Here, this Court's decision was similar to Chemetics. Although the opinion did 
not itself change the prevailing party, the trial on remand might have changed the prevailing 
party. Thus, as the Hummer court pointed out, the district court had jurisdiction to consider "any 
issue, including attorney's fees, that was related to the result in the appeal." As in Chemetics, the 
whistleblower trial on remand may have changed the prevailing party in the overall case, 
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likewise allowing the court to consider attorney's fees which are related to the result of the 
appeal. As Van admits, the Supreme Court did not pass on any aspect of the fee award, 
including its amount or reasonableness. Cross-Respondent's Br. at 35. Accordingly, 
reconsidering or reinstating the award would not contravene any decision of the Court. 
2. This Court's failure to pass on the reasonableness of Judge 
McDermott's fee award does not preclude reinstating the award or 
otherwise awarding fees. 
As discussed above, the Court's failure to rule on the issue of attorney's fees is a 
prerequisite to the trial court having jurisdiction on remand. Accordingly, that prerequisite 
cannot bar the trial court's jurisdiction over the attorney's fees following the jury's verdict for 
PMC. In this case, Judge McDennott examined the requested fees and costs, applied the 
applicable law, and detennined the fees and costs that should be awarded to the prevailing party 
under Section 12-120(3) and Rule 54(d)(IV R. Vol. I at 1-3. As such, he applied the same 
process and the same law that Judge Naftz should have applied (and the same law Judge Naftz 
did apply in awarding fees and costs on appeal and on the whistleblower claim, R. Vol. III 
558-68). Because the fees were for prevailing on summary judgment, none ofthe facts bearing 
on the reasonableness of the award would have changed since Judge McDennott considered 
them. Whether the trial court reinstated the original award or chose to make its own evaluation 
and award, the inescapable fact is that PMC was entitled to mandatory fees for prevailing on the 
I Although Van argues that Judge McDennott included fees and costs for defending the 
whistleblower claims, he cites nothing in the record to support his claim. Cross-Respondent's 
Br. at 39. Therefore, the argument cannot be considered. LA.R. 35(a)(6); Jorgensen v. 
Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524,528, 181 P.3d 450,454 (2008). 
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contract claim. Any award of fees for the contract claims, whether determined by Judge 
McDermott or Judge Naftz, would stand on equal footing in this appeal with the award of fees 
for the prior appeal that is currently before the court. 
3. Having chosen to assert contract-based claims, Van cannot now avoid 
the attorney's fees award that accompanies that choice. 
In his complaint, Van brought claims for wrongful termination in violation of 
Section 6-2101 et seq. SUpp. R. 650, Complaint at ~XXVI. The wrongful termination claim was 
subsequently considered the whistleblower claim. Supp. R. 664, 673-76. In addition to the 
whistleblower claim, Van also brought a claim for breach of contract, alleging two distinct 
claims: breach of contract for termination in violation ofPMC's policies and procedures, and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Supp. R. 650, Complaint a~XXVIII. It is 
well-established in Idaho law that contract claims, including employment contract claims, are 
subject to Section 12-120(3)'s attorney's fees provisions. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 
Idaho 233, 244, 108 P.3d 380,391 (2005). Had Van prevailed on the contract claims, 
undoubtedly he would have submitted a fee petition and offered no objection to the receipt of an 
award of attorney's fees in accordance with the statute. However, having lost on all claims, Van 
now argues that the gravamen of the claims was really statutory, not contractual. Cross-
Respondent's Bf. at 38. This ignores the clear language of the claim: 
[T]hat he was employed subject to a contract of employment with 
Defendant. . .. That he was entitled to the terms, conditions and 
protection of his employment contract with Defendant and that as 
the conduct of Defendants ... the policies and procedures of 
Defendant were violated with regards to Plaintiff s employment, 
and that Defendant [PMC] breached its policies and procedures in 
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tenninating Plaintiff from his employment and further breached 
the implied contract of good faith and fair dealing in its decision to 
tenninate Plaintiffs employment. 
Supp. R. 650, Complaint at ~III (emphasis added). The most cursory read of the foregoing 
establishes that Van's allegations do not rely on any statute, but rather on the contract of 
employment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that PMC violated its own employment policies, not 
a statute or even public policy. Id. The gravamen ofthe contract claim is indeed a contract. 
Accordingly, attorney's fees must be awarded to PMC as the prevailing party under Section 
12-120(3). Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 263, 999 P.2d 914,918 (Ct. App. 
2000). 
B. PMC Is Entitled to Attorney's Fees on the Cross-Appeal Related to the 
Contract Claims. 
PMC's cross-appeal is a continuation of the contract claims, namely, that as the 
prevailing party on summary judgment and in the case overall, PMC is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees under Section 12-120(3). PMC undertook this cross-appeal to obtain the 
remedies to which it is entitled as the prevailing party on a contract claim. As discussed above, 
the prevailing party in a contract claim is entitled to costs and fees on appeal, as well as at the 
trial court level. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3); Daisy Mfg., 134 Idaho at 263,999 P.2d at 918. 
Because PMC's claim for attorney's fees on the cross-appeal is directly related to the contract 
claim, an award of reasonable fees is required. 
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C. Costs and Fees Should Be Awarded to PMC as the Prevailing Party in This 
Appeal Because Van's Appeal Seeks only to Second-Guess the Jury's Verdict 
and His Appeal of the Attorney's Fees Is Frivolous. 
In addition to its entitlement to fees for the cross-appeal under 12-120(3), PMC is 
entitled to attorney's fees related to this appeal under either Idaho Code Section 12-121 or 
Section 6-2107. Under either standard, PMC is entitled to fees if the appeal is without basis in 
law or fact. See IDAHO CODE §§ 12-121,6-2107; Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn 
Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218-19, 177 P.3d 955,965-66 (2008) (holding Section 12-121 
"permits the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party if the court determines the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."). 
Van's appeal of the special verdict relies solely on an effort to second-guess the 
jury, which heard five weeks of evidence before reaching its verdict. Although cloaked in the 
guise of an assertion that the verdict was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, 
Van's appeal does no more than seek to show that the jury got it wrong. In this effort, Van 
alleges a multitude of instances (without citation to the record) in which defendant's counsel 
made "erroneous arguments" and "the district court inappropriately believed him." Cross-
Respondent's Br. at 41.2 Despite these assertions, he has not shown that any ofthese supposed 
errors affected Van's substantive rights or were prejudicial. For example, Van claims that PMC 
"repeatedly interrupted" testimony with objections and the trial was unnecessarily prolonged by 
PMC's "ill-founded arguments." Id. Notwithstanding the unsubstantiated inconvenience of 
2 This entire argument, like the remainder of cross-respondent' s brief, is devoid of a 
single citation to the record that would substantiate the claims being made. 
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objections and the accompanying legal argument, Van has not shown that he had a substantive 
right to uninterrupted testimony or a short( er) trial that was violated. Further, he has not shown 
any facts that would show prejudice resulted from these alleged errors. Lastly, and most 
significantly, Van fails to show how the verdict was not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. 
Van's appeal of the trial court's award of attorney's fees to PMC for the appeal is 
similarly without merit. PMC had sought attorney's fees under the correct statute, 
Section 12-120(3)), in both its Answer to the Complaint in 2006 and its Answer to the Amended 
Complaint in 2010. Supp. R. at 660-61; R. Vol. I at 98. When PMC prevailed on summary 
judgment, Judge McDermott held in 2008 that actions on employment contracts were subject to 
the fee provisions of Section 12-120(3)). R. Vol. I at 2. When PMC prevailed on all claims 
following appeal and subsequent trial, it argued that it was entitled to attorney's fees under both 
this Court's remand and Section 12-120(3)). R. Vol. II at 350-51, 356-58. In case there was any 
ambiguity regarding the basis for the attorney's fees requests, it was further addressed in PMC's 
response to Van's motion to disallow fees. See R. Vol. III at 548 ("PMC is also entitled to its 
fees and costs on appeal under Section 12-120(3)) as PMC is now the prevailing party on all 
claims."). 
Moreover, it should be noted that the 2011 request for attorney's fees both on 
appeal and for prevailing on summary judgment in the contract claims was made against the 
backdrop of Judge McDermott's holding in 2008 that actions on employment contracts were 
subject to the fee provisions of Section 12-120(3)), R. Vol. I at 2, and the Court's remand 
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allowing the court to award attorney's fees related to the appeal. Thus, it was already well-
established law of the case that Section 12-120(3)) applied to the contract claims and that fees 
could be awarded to the prevailing party. See also Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 
259,263, 999 P.2d 914, 918 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding the prevailing party in a contract claim is 
entitled to mandatory attorney's fees both at trial and on appeal). 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, PMC respectfully requests that the Court remand the 
issue of attorney's fees and costs on summary judgment to the trial court for a determination of 
an appropriate award. PMC also requests an award of attorney's fees and costs should it prevail 
on appeal and on cross-appeal under the relevant statutes as discussed supra. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
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